New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. A.L., 462 N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2020). On October 28, 2019, in a per curiam opinion that can be found at 2019 WL 5544014 (App. Div. Oct. 28, 2019), Judges Fisher and Rose affirmed a Family Part decision finding defendant guilty of child abuse and neglect. After summarizing the facts and the arguments presented by defendant and the Law Guardian on appeal, the panel found that those contentions lacked sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, citing Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirmed based on the “comprehensive and well-reasoned written opinion” of the Family Part judge, Judge Bruce Kaplan.
Defendant, through new appellate counsel, moved for reconsideration. She also sought to re-open the record to allow her to press a claim of ineffective assistance by her prior appellate counsel (both appellate counsel were designated through the Office of the Public Defender). That was a novel claim. In an opinion today by Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Rose and Judge Accurso, who was not on the original panel, the Appellate Division remanded that issue for further development.
The reconsideration motion, however, aroused the panel’s ire. Defendant asserted that the panel had “eschewed the basic appellate obligation to review the record” and had failed to “scrupulously review” that record. The sole basis for that argument was “the fact that [the panel’s] opinion is three paragraphs in length.” Judge Fisher emphatically rejected that argument as “frivolous.”
In its three paragraphs, the panel had recounted the fact that, two months before her child was born, defendant had admitted to the plaintiff Division that she was a drug addict, “using as many as five bags of heroin daily.” One month later, the panel noted, defendant tested positive for heroin and cocaine, and one week before the birth, defendant tested positive for cocaine. The Family Part conducted a one-day hearing and found abuse and neglect.
The panel opinion also recognized that defendant had sought to keep the trial record open so she could adduce expert testimony. The Family Part denied that request as belated and without any certainty that defendant could obtain a favorable expert report. The panel found no abuse of discretion in the Family Part’s refusal to continue the hearing.
The panel’s three paragraphs were ample to summarize, accurately, the facts and legal arguments. In today’s opinion, Judge Fisher denounced the “unusual argument … that the length of a court’s opinion is proportionate to the court’s investment of time and energy in its disposition; in other words, defendant apparently believes courts issue lengthy opinions when they have exerted a great amount of effort and short opinions when they have given little or no attention to the record or the arguments. No assertion could be more misinformed or misguided.”
To drive home the point, Judge Fisher cited landmark decisions, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), as examples of “celebrated judicial opinions [that] have been extraordinarily concise when compared to the compelling issues presented.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928), Judge Fisher said, consumed only six paragraphs, but “no law school tort … textbook would be complete” without it.
Judge Fisher then went on to address the panel’s reliance on Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). He noted that the Family Part’s opinion on which the panel had relied was 22 pages long. There was nothing wrong with adopting that ruling. Judge Fisher cited numerous cases, including one involving termination of parental rights, where our Supreme Court had, in comparable fashion, adopted a majority or dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division.
As this blog has often noted, including here and here, Judge Fisher in particular has mastered the art of the concise opinion. As he stated in today’s ruling, “the idea that longer opinions are the product of greater consideration than shorter opinions is just simply wrong.” (Many of us learned in grade school that the related idea that, in writing, “length is strength” is a fallacy).
An opinion need only be long enough to cover the subject. The panel’s brief opinion did that, and substantially incorporated the far longer ruling of the Family Part. In other jurisdictions, appellate courts routinely issue one-sentence, or one-word (“Affirmed”) rulings that offer no illumination at all. Though our Appellate Division has been the busiest undivided appellate court in the United States, its panels virtually never do that. Even when the Appellate Division cites Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), it virtually always goes on to add some explanatory remarks. Defendant’s argument here was indeed “misguided.”
Your blog entry missed the mark in this case. It was initially disappointing in its uncritical genuflection to claims asserted by the panel that you could not possibly know. For example, there really is no possible way you could know whether, as you put it: “The panel’s three paragraphs were ample to summarize, accurately, the facts and legal arguments.” Having read the briefs in this appeal, I can say with confidence that your comment was as misguided and uninformed as was the panel’s opinion. But your blog entry erred more seriously by having missed the overarching point of the reconsideration motion which both the panel and your blog entry simply derided: the need for judicial humility and for appellate judges to remember that what they write can only command respect when their writing demonstrates respect for litigants. The three paragraph opinion that the panel originally produced did not do so and was an abuse of R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Now that is a subject which this blog should consider addressing.
But this is not the first such instance of notable deterioration in appellate jurisprudence, or even a new problem in New Jersey appellate practice. It has been an ongoing problem for years, particularly in child welfare law. Just a couple examples suffice: in one instance, reconsideration had to be sought after an appellate decision involving whether a parent had neglected a child shockingly ended its abbreviated decision not by affirming a neglect judgment but by affirming a termination of parental rights, an issue not at all involved in the appeal. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C., No. A-3477-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2169 (App. Div. Sept. 4, 2014). The panel’s patent inattention to the appellate briefs was glaring in that case, as were several paragraphs of the opinion that were simply lifted verbatim from a different decision three weeks earlier; in that case, responding to a strongly worded reconsideration motion, the appellate panel granted reconsideration, conceded its errors and, after further briefing, agreed both to correct and to reverse its decision. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C., No. A-3477-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2927 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 2014), reconsideration granted and rev’g, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2169 (App. Div. Sept. 4, 2014).
In another decision, an appellate panel determined that the substantive issues raised by a parent under Title 9 had no merit, concluding with the back of the hand: “We find insufficient merit in the arguments contained within Point I to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E.” N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Services v. P.W.R., 410 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2009). Yet that judgment, by the same judge who decided the recent opinion cited by this blog, was unanimously reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court which fully addressed the issues the appellate panel had deemed meritless. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17 (2011).
Moreover, in offering its summary of Judge Fisher’s intemperate opinion, this blog missed the substantive issue that the reconsideration motion provoked the panel to address: opening up R. 4:50 to create the equivalent of a PCR practice for Ineffective Assistance of Counse claims in child welfare cases under Title 9.
A closer read of Judge Fisher’s opinion also suggests internal inconsistencies that this blog missed, as when the opinion reduces criticism of its original opinion to an issue of length, yet almost in the same breath repeats an oft-used phrase that treats the length of a trial court’s opinion as a proxy for its thoroughness and reason for paying deference to it. The reality is that the thin-skinned reaction by this appellate panel was injudicious and unprofessional. If an argument is truly frivolous, it does not take eight pages to address it. To some of us who have practiced regularly in state and federal appellate courts in New Jersey, what you called a court’s “ire” struck others has shameful. What showed through the opinion was a judge who lacked humility and self-awareness, and brought disrepute on the court.
Finally, I do not quibble with the ability of a court to write concise cogent opinions that fully and respectfully resolve appeals. But the opinion you discussed and defended did not do so. Instead, with a kind of pseudo-scholarship, it fashioned its core argument out of falsehoods, and warranted fact-checking. To try to justify the embarrassing three paragraph opinion that distorted facts and conflated legal arguments, the opinion cited notable decisions of state and federal courts that it claims were equally brief as its three paragraph initial opinion. Not so.
For example, the panel cites Brown v. Board of Education, which may have been 13 paragraphs, but that length was over four times as long as the panel’s opinion, and Brown had 13 footnotes which equaled the length of the opinion. So no comparison. The other cases cited are equally unavailing as a misguided defense of brevity, even as they also convey what an appellate opinion should do to earn the respect of litigants and counsel. Bivens had 10 long paragraphs, with 8 footnotes, for the five Justice majority, followed by lengthy dissents. Justice Black’s majority opinion in Gideon, at 13 paragraphs, was four times the length of Judge Fisher’s miserly three paragraph opinion, again not counting Justice Black’s footnotes. Brady also clocks in at 16 paragraphs, not counting a full page of footnotes. Yick Wo is also 16 paragraphs, several of which alone are over a page. Schenck, while 6 paragraphs, is numerically twice the length of Judge Fisher’s paltry three paragraphs, and the paragraphs are twice the length, too. Finally, Palsgraf may be only six paragraphs, but they are full-page length paragraphs, in an opinion that run seven pages alone, so still no comparison!
The point to be made is that so much of what was published in Judge Fisher’s tirade is not how an appellate court can hope to earn the respect of the litigants whose lives are impacted by the court’s decisions. Instead, it sadly telegraphs that some appellate judges, particularly in certain case types, simply are not interested in doing so. That subject is one that this blog should consider addressing.