The Anniversary of Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of Educ.

As the role of administrative agencies has grown, it has happened that more than one agency has, or arguably has, jurisdiction over the same matter.  How is it determined which agency should act?  On this date in 1978, the Supreme Court decided Hinfey v. Matawan Regional Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 514 (1978), which addressed that very issue.

The case involved complaints, filed with the Division on Civil Rights, that alleged that employment practices, athletic programs, and curriculum materials were unlawfully discriminatory on the basis of gender, age, and marital status.  After an Attorney General’s Formal Opinion that determined that the Department of Education had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims, the Division issued an order that transferred the cases to the Department.  The transfer was appealed, and the Appellate Division ruled that although the Division and the Department had concurrent jurisdiction over such matters, the Division had mandatory jurisdiction over cases already filed with it, so that the Division was obligated to process those cases.  The Division appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Handler.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the Division and the Department had concurrent jurisdiction over these cases, but rejected the notion that the Division “had in effect a nontransferable statutory duty to proceed upon those discrimination charges actually filed with it.”  Instead, all the cases were to be handled by the Department.

“There is no reason, absent an occlusive statutory bar, for an administrative agency to be obtuse to the genuine concerns of other administrative agencies which possess concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter.  This is especially so where the controversy is multidimensional and legitimately touches the competence of more than one agency.  In that context, administrative agencies should never be encouraged to engage in internecine struggles for jurisdictional hegemony.”  Instead, “[c]omity and deference” to the agency “which, on a comparative scale, is in the best position by virtue of its statutory status, administrative competence and regulatory expertise to adjudicate the matter.”

In Hinfey, the agency in the best position to adjudicate the issues of “the content of educational programs and courses of study,” the matters transferred to the Department, was in fact the Department.  Those matters implicated “the highest level of professional expertise and judgment in the educational field.”  The Division did not assert that it could match the Department’s competence in this area, and there was every reason to believe that the Department would faithfully resolve the issues.

Justice Handler complimented the Attorney General and the Division for deferring to the Department.  The Division was not “in any sense reneging upon or abnegating its own statutory duties.  Abstention in this context calls for administrative statesmanship and is the essence of concurrent, discretionary jurisdiction responsibly exercised.  The Division acted correctly upon the instructions of the Attorney General in this particular case to transfer these complaints to the Commissioner of Education.  That is where the matter belongs.”