Vanderslice v. Stewart, 220 N.J. 385 (2015). This case arose out of a mandatory, non-binding arbitration of an auto accident. Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) requires that a party who seeks to appeal an award resulting from such an arbitration must do so within thirty days by making a demand for a trial de novo. Here, defendants (Camden County, its Fire Police Department, and Stewart, a sergeant in the Fire Police Department who had gotten into the accident) sought to appeal an award of $145,970 that was entered against them in an arbitration. One day after that award, defendants filed their demand for a trial de novo with the Camden County Arbitration Administrator. Attached to the demand, instead of the required check for the filing fee, was a voucher that gave the Arbitration Administrator the right to payment of the required fee from Camden County’s account with the State Treasurer. The Arbitration Administrator signed the voucher and sent it to the State Treasurer for payment. But the Treasurer did not issue the check until thirty days after the arbitration award, and the Arbitration Administrator did not receive the check until 32 days after that award. Accordingly, the Arbitration Administrator did not docket defendants’ demand for a trial de novo.
Defendants did not learn that their demand for a trial de novo had not been filed, and that they had been treated as not having paid the required fee timely, until plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment. At that point, defendants asked the Law Division to permit a late filing. The Law Division granted defendants’ request, finding that defendants had substantially complied with the Court Rules. A jury trial ensued, which resulted in a “no cause” verdict for defendants. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the Law Division should not have permitted the late filing but should instead have confirmed the arbitration award as plaintiff had asked. The Appellate Division ruled that defendants had acted too late, so the panel reversed the Law Division’s ruling and directed the entry of judgment confirming the arbitration award. Defendants went to the Supreme Court, which applied the de novo standard of review to the purely legal issues before it, reversed the Appellate Division, and approved the Law Division’s ruling.
Though there were a number of arguments made, Justice Solomon found that the case was resolved by reference to Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A). That rule requires that if a paper is submitted without a proper filing fee, “the paper shall be returned [by the Clerk] stamped ‘Received but not Filed (Date),'” along with a notice that tells the filing party that if the paper is resubmitted with the proper fee within ten days of the Clerk’s notice of the deficiency, the paper will be deemed to have been filed on the date that the Clerk first received it. Here, however, notice of the nonconforming fee was never given to defendants. Thus, the ten-day cure period never began to run, so “the conforming check was not received by the county clerk’s office out of time.” As a result, defendants’ demand for a trial de novo was effective, and the Appellate Division’s decision could not stand.
Justice Solomon emphasized that the short deadline for a demand for a trial de novo makes the mandatory notice provisions of Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(A) “of paramount importance,” since substantial rights can be lost in that context absent proper and timely notice of deficiencies in the filing of such demands. But he also stated, more generally, that “technical defects should not serve to defeat an otherwise valid filing,” and that “our court rules elevate a litigant’s right to pursue a claim over the procedural bars resulting from technical filing defects.” Thus, this decision rightly recognizes that when the rules require that a party be allowed to cure technical problems, notice of that right must be given before a party will be adversely affected by its failure to cure such a problem.