Caporusso v. New Jersey Dep’t of Health & Senior Services, 434 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 2014). The prerogative writ of mandamus is the centerpiece of this opinion by Judge Lihotz. Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class, sued the New Jersey Department of Health and others in the Law Division, on the grounds that defendants had not timely and adequately implemented the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-1 to -16. Plaintiffs, who included patients qualified to receive medical marijuana and a doctor who sought medical marijuana for his patients but found the requirements too burdensome, demanded various forms of injunctive and/or declaratory relief. The Law Division determined that it did not have jurisdiction, ruling that plaintiffs were actually appealing a final decision or action of the Department, so that Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) vested jurisdiction in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division granted only one form of relief that plaintiffs sought and rejected all the others.
Though plaintiffs’ complaint was “muddled,” Judge Lihotz distilled it to four basic claims. First, plaintiffs sought an order compelling the Department to act to implement the statute. Second, plaintiffs asserted a damage claim for due process violations. Third, plaintiffs alleged that the Department’s inaction constituted an intentional tort or negligence, giving rise to damages. Finally, plaintiffs claimed that the Department failed to comply with several Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) requests.
Judge Lihotz easily disposed of the final two claims. The tort claims were barred because plaintiffs had not given the notice required by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. The OPRA claim failed because it was brought too late, beyond the 45-day OPRA statute of limitations.
Turning to the remaining claims, Judge Lihotz provided a very detailed and useful description of mandamus and its limitations. The authority of a court under the mandamus power to compel agency action “is exercised sparingly, as courts are ill-equipped to manage an agency’s activities.” A challenge to inaction by a State agency can seek to compel only “mandated ministerial obligations,” of a type that “do not require an evaluative judgment in the exercise of discretion.” This principle is one that the Appellate Division has previously stated. Moreover, the standard of review in an administrative agency context is whether the agency conducted itself in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable fashion. Deference to the agency “is particularly appropriate when the case involves the construction of a new statute by its implementing agency.”
Judge Lihotz then applied these guideposts to the specific types of relief that plaintiffs sought by way of mandamus. The first type of relief sought to eliminate “burdensome hurdles to physicians willing to prescribe marijuana” pursuant to the statute. That relief had the potential of interfering with the orderly workings of the Department in implementing the statute. Besides, plaintiffs’ evidence of burdensomeness was merely anecdotal, and plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
The second form of requested relief was an order compelling the Department to complete its background investigation of applicants to operate treatment centers within thirty days so as to speed up licensure of treatment centers. The panel concluded that this relief was discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore not a proper form of mandamus relief. The Department had approved six treatment center applications, but that did not end the process, since the statute “does not allow for automatic licensure.” Rather, licensure by the Department was dependent on approvals from other state agencies, municipal inspection and permitting, and other prerequisites. There was no evidence that the Department had unreasonably delayed or failed to perform its responsibilities.
Plaintiffs did prevail, however, on their demand that the Department be required to issue reports to the Governor and the Legislature as required by the statute. The Department admitted that it had not rendered any such reports, but pointed to “its general public communications and annual report submittal during the legislative budget process.” Judge Lihotz found those communications insufficient to satisfy the statute. Reporting is “not discretionary, but involves a ministerial function.” Accordingly, mandamus relief compelling such reporting was appropriately granted. There was no due process violation in anything that plaintiffs had alleged.
Finally, the panel rejected plaintiffs’ attack on the regulations promulgated by the Department to implement the statute. Once again, Judge Lihotz again offered a catalog of legal principles applicable to challenges to administrative regulations. Plaintiffs failed to show that the regulations were ultra vires, and in any event any challenge to regulations had to be brought first before the agency, which plaintiffs did not do.
This opinion is an excellent resource for any party or counsel who is involved in an administrative agency matter. It illuminates very well the applicable principles in a number of different areas of administartive law.