Wiest v. Lynch, 701 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2013). This is a very interesting case brought under the whistleblower protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. §1514A, and Pennsylvania law. The Third Circuit, voting 2-1, reversed in part a summary that had been entered for defendants and remanded some of plaintiff’s claims for trial. Judge Vanaskie wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge McKee joined. Judge Jordan was the dissenter.
From an appellate practice perspective, however, the case addresses several important points. First, the court addressed and rejected a defense argument that because plaintiff’s notice of appeal specified only the district court’s decision denying reconsideration as the subject of appeal, plaintiff could not also argue that the original decision of the district court, as to which he had sought reconsideration, was error.
Judge Vanaskie observed that the court liberally construes notices of appeal. The court may exercise jurisdiction over orders not specified in the notice of appeal where “(1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.” All that was so here. The original ruling and the denial of reconsideration were “intertwined.” Thus, the court would hear arguments as to both orders.
This was an eminently commonsensical result. Still, it is more prudent to list expressly all orders being appealed, so as to avoid any risk of being precluded from addressing any such order.
Second, defendant argued that the motion for reconsideration below was untimely in any event because plaintiff filed it six days after the 14-day deadline set by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Local Rules. Judge Vanaskie did not agree. Even under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves, the time limits for a motion to alter or amend a judgment “are claims-processing rules, rather than jurisdictional rules.” The same must therefore be so of similar deadlines under Local Rules. Regardless, the panel treated the motion for reconsideration as a Federal Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, and plaintiff was timely under the 28-day window provided by that rule. Still, it is preferable to comply with deadlines set by Local Rules, again to minimize or eliminate risk.
Third, Judge Vanaskie quickly rejected an argument that plaintiff had waived an argument based on a particular precedent because he had raised that contention only on the motion for reconsideration even though the precedent had been available when plaintiff briefed the original motion. The district court addressed that precedent in its ruling and “evidently did not deem Wiest to have waived any argument based on [that precedent”], and neither do we.”