Hehre v. DeMarco, 421 N.J. Super. 501 (App. Div. 2011). Plaintiff, a student at Holy Spirit High School, was injured in an auto accident while being driven to a school-sponsored track meet by a fellow student-athlete at the school. Holy Spirit High School is affiliated with and sponsored by the Catholic Diocese of Camden. Plaintiff sued not only the driver of the vehicle, but also the school, the Diocese, and the track coach.
The school, Diocese and coach moved for summary judgment, based on the Charitable Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. The Law Division denied the motion.
That court recognized that the school would ordinarily be immune under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a), which protects any “nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, employees, agents or volunteers.” But the judge believed that an exception to that immunity, contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2), which exempts an otherwise immune “trustee, director, officer, employee, agent, servant or volunteer” of a charity who causes “damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle,” would allow the case to go forward against the school if plaintiff proved that the fellow-student driver was acting as an agent of any of the moving defendants.
Defendants sought and were granted leave to appeal. In an opinion by Judge Fuentes, the Appellate Division reversed and entered summary judgment for the school, the coach and the Diocese.
There was no question that the high school was a charitable entity or that plaintiff was a beneficiary of the school’s charitable activities. Judge Fuentes then analyzed in detail the language and history of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a) and 2A:53A-7(c)(2), and concluded that “the Legislature intended the immunity exception to apply only to the individual actors expressly designated by the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2), and not to corresponding charitable entities, which are otherwise shielded from liability under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a).” Had the Legislature intended the exemption to extend to charitable entities as well as the individual actors, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) would have been drafted to mirror N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a), which expressly covers not only individuals but charitable entities as well.
Plaintiff argued that this view “ignores the scope of agency and vicarious liability ordinarily applicable to corporate actors.” Judge Fuentes rejected this argument because plaintiff had not cited any law to support the importation of those doctrines into the plain language of the N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c)(2) exemption.