Mahwah Realty Associates, Inc. v. Mahwah Tp.., 420 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 2011). Out of the lengthy procedural history of this land use matter comes the simple message that statutes are not to be read with excessive literalness where the result of that would be absurd. Judge Fisher wrote the opinion for the panel.
The case involved Mahwah’s adoption of an ordinance that was inconsistent with its Master Plan. Under the Municipal Land Use Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a, the governing body’s reasons for adopting such an ordinance must be “set forth in a resolution and recorded in its [the governing body’s] minutes” (emphasis added). Here, the governing body had adopted a resolution that “thoroughly explains the rationale behind the council’s decision.” Although that resolution was referred to in the meeting minutes, “the minutes [did] not recite those contents verbatim nor any other verbatim statements made by council members at that time.”
The trial judge found that N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a “is unambiguous and requires that the reasons for adopting the ordinance be recorded in the minutes pursuant to discussion at the hearing, in addition to being set forth in the resulting resolution.” The judge also found that the resolution is not a substitute for the governing body discussing during the public meeting the reasons for deviating from the master plan so that those reasons may be clearly expressed to the public in the meeting minutes.
The panel found that this view of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a “represents a plausible and not unreasonable interpretation of the statutory language,” but that it created a burden on municipalities that the Legislature did not intend. The idea that the minutes must reflect in detail “the governing body’s thought process” is not consistent with the way that minutes have always been viewed. Minutes “need only contain a recitation of the matters discussed, the identities of the speakers, a summary of the discussion, and a statement of the decisions made.” The minutes here sufficiently contained these elements and also referred to the detailed resolution. There was no obligation to reiterate the contents of the resolution in the minutes.
Quoting Judge Learned Hand’s famous dictum that “[t]here is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language– be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract– than to read the words literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is meant to secure,” Judge Fisher concluded by stating that “N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62a undoubtedly intends to secure for the public, the litigants, and the reviewing courts, a clear understanding of the rationale underlying the governing body’s actions.” The council’s action in adopting a detailed resolution and referring to that resolution in the minutes satisfied the intent of the statute as well as its literal language.