Nead v. Union Cty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, 2011 WL 166205 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011). This case, which resulted in a reversal of a trial court’s decision to dismiss an employment discrimination case, teaches several things about motions for reconsideration. First, the decision clarifies that motions for reconsideration of interlocutory decisions are to be made under Rule 1:7-4, which in turn refers to Rule 4:42-2, rather than under Rule 4:49-2. The plaintiff in Nead had invoked both Rule 1:7-4 and Rule 4:49-2, perhaps in an effort to ensure that no ground for reconsideration was overlooked. This reliance on both Rules has occurred frequently. See, e.g., Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 382 (App. Div. 1996). Now, it appears no longer to be necessary.
Second, however, the court emphasized that “in order to maintain a consistent methodology for all motions seeking reconsideration, we believe that the same modes of thought and methods of analysis should apply to applications for reconsideration of both interlocutory (Rule 4:42-2) and final (Rule 4:49-2) orders. At its core, the guiding principle for all such reviews will always be the furtherance of the interests of justice.” This “uniform approach will also enhance predictability and serve to fortify our observance of precedent.” Thus, as a practical matter, it may not matter under which Rule reconsideration is sought, though the Court’s first lesson clarified that.
Third, though many decisions have expressed unhappiness with motions for reconsideration, Nead makes clear that such motions are appropriate in proper circumstances. The Appellate Division observed that a motion for reconsideration is “after all, an inherent– as well as a rule-based– adjunct to the decisional process of dispute resolution,” and that courts “should not begrudge parties the right” to seek reconsideration.
In Nead, the court stated, the Law Division was not wrong to reconsider its original ruling denying summary judgment. That court “was confronted with a complicated jurisprudential landscape littered with difficult legal principles, many dependent upon subtle principles of federal law.” In those circumstances, reconsideration, which resulted in the grant of summary judgment, “emblemized an attempt to further the interests of justice,” even though the Appellate Division ultimately reversed that summary judgment and reinstated the case.
On a different note, Nead also illustrates the principle of Rule 4:6-2 that when parties submit materials beyond the complaint on a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the motion judge does not exclude those materials, the motion must be converted to a summary judgment motion under R. 4:46. In Nead, the parties “unflinchingly appended a wealth of discovery materials to their respective moving papers, going far beyond the four corners of Nead’s complaint.” Thus, the Appellate Division considered the merits of the case under the summary judgment standard.
SPECULATION ALERT! This was a per curiam opinion, not signed by any of the three judges who were on the panel. But there is reason to suppose that Judge Harris, one of the listed panel members, authored the opinion. In its discussion of motions for reconsideration, the opinion cites a number of prior cases, including one Chancery Division decision, but omits reference to D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990). D’Atria was written by Judge Harris, and was one of the first cases to discuss the standards for motions for reconsideration. The Appellate Division has cited it over 100 times, according to WestlawNext, including more than a dozen times in 2010 alone. The absence of D’Atria from Nead may indicate judicial modesty by Judge Harris in deciding not to cite his own opinion.